From the nature of the mind to personal dignity [electronic resource] : the significance of Rosmini's philosophy / Juan F. Franck.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 197-204) and indexes.

Rosmini's life and work -- Toward an ontological foundation of personhood -- The present study -- The nature of knowledge -- The problem of knowledge -- Fundamental difference between sensation and idea -- Activity and passivity in sense perception -- The subjective and the extrasubjective in sensation -- Sensation and idea compared -- The intellective perception -- The judgment contained in the idea of the thing -- The idea of existence -- Characteristics of this idea -- Innatism of the idea of existence -- The idea and sensation are primitive elements -- The idea as a necessary means of knowledge -- Ideas and reality -- The idea of being, pure mediator of knowledge -- The knowledge of existing reality through the idea -- Kant's a priori synthesis and Rosmini's primitive synthesis -- Kant, innatism, and the lumen intellectuale -- The idea is one form of being -- Ideal being is the knowability of real being -- Ideal being is the possibility of things -- Note on the possibility and necessity of ideas -- The idea and the mind -- The book about the idea in the Teosofia -- Essere per s�e manifesto : manifestato and manifestante -- Objective mode (or form) of being : absolute and relative existence -- Absolute and relative existence of ideas and ideal being -- Intelligibility is an attribute of being itself -- The intimate bond between the idea and the intelligence -- Objective being and Plato's Parmenides -- Self-contradictory objects -- The idea and the dignity of the person -- Initial being and the place of intelligences in the whole of being -- Initial being and the lumen intellectuale -- The divine in nature -- Individuality and immortality -- The intelligent will -- Objective being and ethics -- The ultimate root of personal dignity.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries.